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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION - EFFECT
OF IMMUNITY FROM STATE PROSECUTION
A witness subpoenaed to appear before the Ohio Un-American Ac-
tivities Commission refused to answer questions-propounded to her "... be-
cause to do so would give your committee an opportunity to incriminate
me." Witnesses appearing before the commission were given immunity
from subsequent state criminal prosecution by virtue of a state immunity
statute." One month after the hearing the commission caused an indict-
ment to issue charginj the witness with contempt for her refusal to answer
the questions.&2 She, along with several others similarly charged, was con-
victed and sentenced.
On appeal, the defendant contended that in spite of the immunity
statute, she was entitled to the constitutionally secured privilege not to in-
criminate herself.3 She pointed out that the state immunity statute, though
offering full protection from subsequent state prosecution did not and
could not protect her from subsequent federal prosecution.
Thus the issue was presented, whether a -state immunity statute, suf-
ficient to preclude prosecution under the laws of the state but which could
not afford immunity from federal prosecution, supplants the privilege
against self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in a 4-3 decision affirmed the conviction. 4
The court relied heavily on decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States5 wherein that court interpreted federal immunity statutes of similar
language in construing the effect of the self-incrimination clause of the
Federal Constitution.6
The Ohio court, in following the federal view, based its decision upon
the concept of two separate and distinct sovereignties. The court reasoned
that though the powers of government, both federal and state, are exercised
within the same territorial limits, those powers are separate and distinct.
The state and federal governments act separately and independently of each
other. The state need only concern itself with activity within its own
sphere. Once having laid this foundation, the court concluded that the
state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was satisfied by the
1 OHIO REV. CODE § 101.44.
'The witness was indicted under OHIO REv. CODE 5 2917.42.
'The privilege against self-incrimination is secured by OHIO CONST. Art. 1 9 10.
'State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956).
"United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. United States, 322
US. 487 (1944).
'U. S. CONSr. Amend. V.
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immunity offered against subsequent state prosecution. Although this was
the first time the court ruled on the extent of the privilege against self-
incrimination with respect to this immunity statute, the dause was in-
terpreted in the same way in a prior decision in which the court considered
a statute of similar language.7
Three judges of the court dissented, each on different grounds. Judge
Taft and Judge Stewart would have determined the case on other issues.'
Judge Hart's dissent struck at the issue here presented. He said that since
the state cannot give immunity from subsequent federal prosecution, the
witness cannot be compelled to answer as she has available the privilege
against self-incrimination secured by the fifth amendment of the Federal
Constitution. To support this position Judge Hart relied on cases wherein
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that federal immunity
statutes did not supplant the privilege against self-incrimination since
the statutes did not close the door completely as to subsequent federal prose-
cutions.9 Some of the language in these decisions, when taken from con-
text, appears to be authority for this dissent. However, closer examination
reveals that the Supreme Court, when speaking of" ... absolute immunity
against future prosecution ..... ,,"0 referred only to immunity within the
federal sphere. In no way did the Supreme Court indicate that a federal
immunity statute to be effective = must give full protection as to subsequent
'Mouser v. PUC, 124 Ohio St. 425, 179 N.E. 133 (1931).
8 Judge Taft points out that the immunity statute under consideration applies only
to hearings before "a select committee of the General Assembly." A reading of the
statutes authorizing the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission (OHIO Rzv. CODE
§§ 103.31-103.38) shows that, "Nowhere in those sections is there any suggestion
that the General Assembly regarded this 'commission' as a 'committee.' It studiously
and successfuly avoided the use of the word 'committee."' He concluded that since
this action was brought under a statute which referred specifically to "select commit-
tees" the action must fail, for this investigative group is a commission.
Judge Stewart in his dissent says that the court glossed over the record to arrive
at their conclusion. He says the real facts of the case were that the commission, which
was composed in part of able and experienced lawyers, apprised the witness that she
had the privilege not to answer questions which would tend to incriminate her. She
was told that this was a right guaranteed by the "Fifth Amendment." The questions
were asked, and upon her refusal to answer no effort was made to insist upon an
answer. Judge Stewart stated, "Even if the chairman was mistaken as to the law
and the effect of the Ohio immunity statute, and Mrs. Morgan was likewise mistaken,
how can it be said that she was in contempt of the commission in strictly following
its direction and admonition? The point is further emphasized by the fact that in
every instance when she refused to answer a question, claiming protection against
self-incrimination, she was never directed to answer the question but the interrogator
immediately proceeded with another inquiry."
9Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323 (1950).
" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
' The immunity statutes herein considered protected the witness only as to the evi-
(September
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state prosecutions. The dissent completely ignored the line of United
States Supreme Court decisions which hold that the rights secured by the
fifth amendment are not rights of citizenship to be held inviolate from
action by the states.12 The Supreme Courts of Florida ' and Louisiana' 4
protect witnesses under the fifth amendment in state proceedings. It is
submitted that these cases would be reversed :by the United States Supreme
Court because of their conflict with the federal view of the fifth amend-
ment.
Michigan is the only other state which protects witnesses in state pro-
ceedings from incriminating themselves as to federal law. The Supreme
Court of that state has held that state immunity statutes do not destroy the
privilege against self-incrimination where the witness would be subject to
subsequent federal prosecution. 15 The court here says the privilege is
secured by the state constitution.
In a well reasoned opinion the Michigan Court said,
We are aware that holdings at variance... can be found in other juris-
dictions, including holdings in the Federal Courts. Nonetheless we adhere
to our previous holdings, not alone on the ground of established precedent,
but rather that the holdings ... are essential to render fairly effective...
the state constitutional provision against self-incrimination. It seems like
a travesty on verity to say that one is not subjected to self-incrimination
when compelled to give testimony in a State judicial proceeding which
testimony may forthwith be used against him in a federal prosecution.?'
This view would stand the test of an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court since it represents the interpretation by a state court of the extent
of its own state constitutional provision.
In analyzing the effect of immunity statutes under the federal and
Ohio view, we find the potential witness in a peculiar position. A state
body may compel testimony under a state immunity statute which may be
used in a subsequent federal prosecution. The other side of the coin shows
that a federal body may compel testimony under a federal immunity statute
which may be used in a subsequent state prosecution.' 7 This, in spite of
dence elicited. The court held that an immunity statute to be effective must protect
the witness from all prosecution in the area in which testimony was being elicited.
"
2Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. People, 332 U.S. 46
(1947).
"State ex rel Mitchel v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
"Louisiana v. Dominquez, 228 la. 284, 82 So.2d 12 (1955).
' People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
Id. at 651, 29 N.W.2d at 287.
"The Supreme Court of the United States in a recent decision declared that Congress
has the power to grant immunity from subsequent state prosecutions in cases involv-
ing an interference with the security or defense of the United States by treason,
espionage, or other forms of subversion. Ullman v. United States, - U.S. -, 76
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